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Introduction
In the 1990s the former Yugoslavia, and in particular BosniaHerzegovina (BiH), was ravaged by violent conflict. As a result, BiH
has been under the tutelage of different international and regional
actors since the signing of the Dayton peace agreements in 1995,
including the Office of the High Representative (OHR). 1 These
actors first rebuilt physical and infrastructural damage and
subsequently monitored BiH’s democratization process to strengthen
its political institutions and support its war-torn society during the
post-conflict transition. Several authors argue that despite numerous
reform initiatives BiH’s society continues to grapple with ethnic
divisions, which fuel persistent political crises and institutional
instability. 2 In addition to the political turmoil at both the federal and
The OHR is an ad hoc international institution that oversees the implementation
of the peace agreement and represents the countries involved in the peace accords
through the Peace and Implementation Council. For more information see OHR
website at http://www.ohr.int/, accessed February 20, 2012. While its current head
the Austrian Valentin Inzko used to also be the European Union (EU) Special
Representative for BiH, since 2011, the EU has decided to appoint a separate
representative for this position. Currently, Peter Sørensen, from Denmark has been
chosen for the EU Special Representative position. The aim of decoupling both
positions is to prepare BiH for the EU accession process, according to the EU.
2 Florian Bieber, “Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Preparing for
EU Accession,” Policy Brief European Policy Center, 2010; Roberto Belloni, “Bosnia:
Dayton Is Dead! Long Live Dayton!” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 15.3–4 (2009):
355–75; Bruce Hitchner, “From Dayton to Brussels: The Story Behind the
1
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state level, Bosnian civil society fell below expectations of Western
aid actors and evaluations of international nongovernmental
organizations (INGOs), which operated in the region with funding
from Western donors. 3 Ironically, in spite of weak civil society
structures, early literature on development aid and democracy
promotion examined why donors showed a greater interest in
providing assistance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
rather than to government institutions. 4 Although this trend applies
to the overall political and democratic transition processes in BiH, 5
this study illustrates that development aid for transitional justice
strategies does not follow this pattern. On the contrary, international
government donors have been reluctant to support civil society
initiatives, and instead favor government-backed projects.
In view of a growing debate on the role of civil society in
transitional justice processes around the world, 6 this article examines
Constitutional and Governmental Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina,”
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30 (2006): 125.
3 Roberto Belloni, “Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transitions,” in From War to
Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, ed. Anna Jarstad (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 182–211; Martina Fischer, Peacebuilding and Civil Society in
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years after Dayton (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2005); Adam Fagan,
“Civil Society in Bosnia Ten Years after Dayton,” International Peacekeeping 12.3
(2005): 406–19; David Chandler, “Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil
Society Building Strategies,” Democratization 5.4 (1998): 78–102.
4 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and
Democracy Promotion (Carnegie Endowment, 2000); Gordon Crawford, “Promoting
Democracy from Without - Learning from Within (Part I),” Democratization 10.1
(2003): 77–98.
5 Chandler, “Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building
Strategies;” Adam Fagan, “Transnational Aid for Civil Society Development in
Post-Socialist Europe: Democratic Consolidation or a New Imperialism?” Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 22.1 (2006): 115–34; Jorgen Skov Sorensen,
“Pluralism or Fragmentation,” War Report 35 (1997).
6 David Androff, “Can Civil Society Reclaim Truth? Results from a CommunityBased Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” The International Journal of Transitional
Justice 6.2 (May 24, 2012): 296–317; Cath Collins, Lorena Balardini, and Jo-Marie
Burt, “Mapping Perpetrator Prosecutions in Latin America,” The International Journal
of Transitional Justice 7.1 (December 12, 2012): 8–28; Christoph Sperfeldt,
“Cambodian Civil Society and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” The International Journal
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 35-62
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the relationship between international donors and domestic civil
society actors engaging in alternative post-conflict justice activities,
including fact-finding initiatives and memory-related projects. As
research on international aid for post-conflict justice efforts has only
found limited scholarly attention thus far, this study focuses on
Scandinavian aid practices in BiH. It explores in particular Sweden
and Norway’s involvement, as Scandinavian countries have been
norm-shaping and innovative development actors in the past. 7 In
spite of an increasing number of restorative justice projects
implemented by local NGOs in BiH, transitional justice aid from
Scandinavian state donors to Bosnian human rights advocates
remains insubstantial. This begs the question as to why Norwegian
and Swedish governments are reluctant to provide financial support
to local civil society initiatives engaged in post-conflict justice.
Drawing on extensive fieldwork data, the author argues that several
factors, including institutional and ideological obstacles, have fueled
this problematic trend.
The first part of this article reviews a selection of the
literature on post-conflict development and transitional justice to
stress the importance of interdisciplinary analysis and the role of civil
society in post-conflict justice contexts. Additionally, it calls for
further academic research on international donor practices in
transitional justice contexts to better understand persisting statecentric aid strategies despite the burgeoning role of NGOs. The
second part summarizes the research design and methodologies used
of Transitional Justice 6.1 (2012): 149–60; Aron Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri,
“Lost in Translation? Civil Society, Faith-Based Organizations and the Negotiation
of International Norms,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 5.3 (2011):
345–65; E. Haslam, “Subjects and Objects: International Criminal Law and the
Institutionalization of Civil Society,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 5.2
(2011): 221–40; Sari Kouvo and Dallas Mazoori, “Reconciliation, Justice and
Mobilization of War Victims in Afghanistan,” The International Journal of Transitional
Justice 5.3 (2011): 492–503.
7 Sunniva Engh and Helge Pharo, “Nordic Cooperation in Providing Development
Aid,” in Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in
Transnational Alignment, ed. Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggrén (New York:
Routledge, 2009), 112.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 35-62
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in this study. The research is based on qualitative data collected
during extensive fieldwork, including semi-structured interviews,
government reports and other official documents. Against the
backdrop of the growing role of post-conflict NGOs in BiH
presented in the third part of this article, the last part analyses the
reasons as to why donors are reluctant to support alternative
transitional justice initiatives led by Bosnian NGOs.
Post-Conflict Development, Transitional Justice and NGOs
The issues examined in post-conflict development studies, peace
studies, and transitional justice studies are complementary, leading to
an increase in interdisciplinary analyses in the last few years. 8 Such
work, however, is still in its initial stages and this article provides
additional insights for cross-boundary research. At present, it remains
difficult to link different issues across disciplinary lines. As a case in
point, transitional justice “often comes to represent a trade-off of
sorts between justice or development, rather than promoting
development with justice.” 9 In fact, transitional justice is a relatively
new field. Early literature that influenced transitional justice studies
was concerned with the question of post-authoritarian regime change
in different regions across the world, such as Latin America and
Eastern Europe. 10 Practitioners and scholars who built on democratic
transition concepts eventually coined the term transitional justice in
For a discussion on these issues see for instance the special issue on development
of the International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2 (3), 2008. See also Chandra Lekha
Sriram et al., Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and ExCombatants (New York: Routledge, 2012).
9 Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus
between Transitional Justice and Development,” International Journal of Transitional
Justice 2.3 (2008): 253–65.
10 See for instance Guillermo O’Donnell and Paul Schmitter, Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1993); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
8
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the 1990s. 11 The burgeoning advocacy-oriented work now includes
legal, normative, socio-political and anthropological scholarship, to
name only a few areas of inquiry. 12 Over time, the thematic and
geographic map of transitional justice grew globally and, with it, the
number of those who are involved. The list of actors engaged in
transitional justice practices today contains not only states, but also
international organizations, NGOs and individuals. 13
As research in this newly established field transgressed
disciplinary boundaries, critical debates have emerged, including for
example work situated at the intersection of post-conflict studies and
transitional justice. 14 While the linkage between these disciplines is a
positive development, critics of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, 15
such as Chandra Lekha Sriram, have nonetheless expressed concerns:
The field known as transitional justice, once potentially
separate from the field known as peacebuilding, is thus now
tightly linked to it. This is certainly appropriate and necessary:
Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former
Regimes: General Considerations (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995);
Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2000).
For a genealogy of the emergence of the field see Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’
Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” Human
Rights Quarterly 31.2 (2009): 321–67.
12 Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, “Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of
International War Crime Tribunals and Transitional Justice,” Annual Review of
Political Science 7.1 (2004): 345–62.
13 Jelena Subotić, “The Transformation of International Transitional Justice
Advocacy,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 6.1 (2012): 106–25; Christine
Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘NonField,’” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3.1 (2009): 5–27; Ruti G. Teitel,
“Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 69.
14 See for instance the edited volume on victims and ex-combatants Sriram et al.,
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground.. For work on the nexus between
peace and justice from an accountability-oriented perspective see Jessica Lincoln,
Transitional Justice, Peace and Accountability: Outreach and the Role of International Courts
After Conflict (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2011).
15 The ‘liberal peacebuilding critique’ is research, which is skeptical about the
benefits of transforming war-shattered states into liberal democracies with market
economies. For a detailed discussion see for instance Roland Paris, At War’s End
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
11
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it would be a mistake to seek to “do justice” in a political
vacuum, or to seek to build peace without addressing the
horrors of the recent past. To treat each separately would be
to risk both. However, the subsumption of transitional justice
by the liberal peacebuilding apparatus potentially subjects
transitional justice to some of the same flaws and critiques of
the peacebuilding agenda. 16
One of the flaws she mentions, for instance, is the culturally
insensitive institutionalization and liberalization strategies of
international actors that potentially constitute new sources of
conflict. 17 While her work showcases several issues associated with
post-conflict development, it does not seek to answer the question of
why external actors nevertheless continue these practices. Moreover,
her analysis is centered on a state-level perspective, addressing
grassroots and civil society initiatives only in passing. To go beyond
these limitations, the present article particularly explores donor
practices in view of the role of NGOs in transitional justice contexts.
Many Bosnian NGOs emerged over the past decade to address
wrongdoings of the past using completely different strategies than the
established international and domestic war crimes trials. Yet, despite
this trend, it is puzzling as to why many external government donors
have shied away from directly supporting these grassroots transitional
justice efforts.
The need to improve the role of civil society in transitional
justice processes has received some scholarly attention, globally as
well as regionally. 18 Notwithstanding the descriptive insights of
several cases, little has been written on the relationship between
Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of
Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21.4 (2007): 587.
17 Sriram, “Justice as Peace?” 586-587.
18 Martin Albrow, Helmut K. Anheier, and Hakan Seckinelgin, Global Civil Society
2011: Globality and the Absence of Justice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pt.
IV; Olivera Simić and Zala Volčič, eds., Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the
Balkans (New York: Springer, 2013); Cath Collins, Post-Transitional Justice: Human
Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2011).
16

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 35-62

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss5/2

6

Kurze: Time for Change

41 Time for Change

international state donors and local non-profit actors in post-conflict
justice settings. Instead, scholarship has generally expanded existing
normative-oriented research. As a case in point, David Backer’s
study, which is part of this normative body of scholarship, provides a
general framework to trace the links between civil society activities
and government practices. He claims that “both government and civil
society can contribute to and stand to gain from the [post-conflict
reconciliation] process, but only if they achieve an appropriate
balance of roles.” 19 Contrary to Backer’s work, however, this article
focuses on the imbalanced roles that are in place. In fact, aid is
favorably provided to government institutions. The study underlines
the current struggle of different local NGO initiatives, explaining the
reasons behind the persistence of state-centric aid. Moreover, Backer
does not question the impact and influence of international postconflict justice advocates, such as organizations including the United
Nations and the International Center for Transitional Justice, on local
transitional justice processes.
Other authors have challenged this trend. 20 Unsatisfied with
the top-down structure applied by international post-conflict actors,
Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern argue that
the agenda being set for transitional justice, as it is currently
constituted, tends to marginalize issues, questions, and
approaches that might either challenge the forms and norms
of Western governance, or implicate dominant global
economic relations in the causes of conflict, rather than its
solution. 21

David Backer, “Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns and
Prospects,” New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 2.3 (2003): 299.
20 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional
Justice from the Bottom Up,” Journal of Law and Society 35.2 (2008): 265–92; Anna
Di Lellio and Caitlin McCurn, “Engineering Grassroots Transitional Justice in the
Balkans The Case of Kosovo,” Eastern European Politics and Societies: EEPS 27.1
(2013): 129–48.
21 Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?”; Di Lellio and McCurn, “Engineering
Grassroots Transitional Justice,” 274.
19
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The authors discuss how excluding local communities as active
participants in transitional justice efforts raises basic questions of
legitimacy, local ownership, and participation. 22 Zala Volčič and
Olivera Simić’s edited volume contributes to this debate with a
number of case studies analyzing civil society actors across the
Balkans. 23 The authors take a critical look at national strategies and
local practices by closely examining international transitional justice
priorities and exploring the complex justice processes currently
underway in the region. Jill Irvine and Patrice McMahon’s chapter,
for example, scrutinizes domestic transitional justice efforts and
especially the local actors who implement these initiatives. 24 Drawing
on social movement theory, they show that ‘grassroots efforts to
promote transitional justice must overcome significant obstacles in
framing issues, creating coalitions and engaging the state. 25 Several
other authors, including Arnaud Kurze and Iva Vukušić, have also
looked at regional human rights activists and civil society
organizations involved in the creation of a transnational fact-finding
initiative. 26 They find that in addition to external causes that have
Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?”; Di Lellio and McCurn, “Engineering
Grassroots Transitional Justice,” 266. Their research is grounded in a growing
scholarship on critical development studies and transitional justice. See also
Christine Bell, Colm Campbell, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Justice Discourses in
Transition,” Social & Legal Studies 13.3 (2004): 305–28; Colm Campbell and
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies,”
Human Rights Quarterly 27.1 (2005): 172–213; Peter Uvin, “Difficult Choices in the
New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in Rwanda after the
Genocide,” Third World Quarterly 22.2 (2001): 177–89.
23 Simić and Volčič, Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans.
24 Jill A. Irvine and Patrice C. McMahon, “From International Courts to Grassroots
Organizing: Obstacles to Transitional Justice in the Balkans,” in Transitional Justice
and Civil Society in the Balkans, ed. Olivera Simić and Zala Volčič, Springer Series in
Transitional Justice (New York: Springer, 2013), 217–37.
25 Irvine and McMahon, “ From International Courts to Grassroots Organizing,”
218-219.
26 Arnaud Kurze and Iva Vukusic, “Afraid to Cry Wolf: Human Rights Activists’
Struggle of Transnational Accountability Efforts in the Balkans,” in Transitional
Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans, ed. Olivera Simić and Zala Volčič (New York,
NY: Springer New York, 2013), 201–15.
22
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hampered the creation of a regional truth commission, internal
factors also encumbered the efforts on the ground to establish
additional measures to deal with past mass atrocities. 27
The focus of this research, however, goes further, exploring
the link between donor practices and transitional justice. Some recent
work already examines the effects and impact of local justice in
relation to global transitional justice practices. 28 Although the need to
address remedies within specific contexts is crucial to successfully
implement transitional justice strategies, many of the current
practices fail to embrace locality. As Moses Okello points out,
“transitional justice language would undeniably have to move from
hierarchical understanding of justice processes to one based upon
place.” 29 As a result, a number of authors have elaborated on the
question between a global post-conflict justice discourse, especially in
view of international law norms, and the consequences of these
practices on the ground. 30 Despite the growing interest in the impact
of civil society in transitional justice settings, it is still unclear why
notably innovative and norm-shaping international state donors
continue with liberal development strategies that are not adequately
tailored to the needs of local populations. The work by Sara Kendall,
for instance, addresses this question by framing development and
post-conflict justice accountability in terms of a market-oriented
discourse. According to her, the creation of consulting firms by
former prosecutors and investigators
illustrates the emerging triangulation between justice, security,
and development. While the scholarly field of international
criminal law tends to look inward to its evolving
See also Alex Jeffrey, “The Political Geographies of Transitional Justice,”
Transactions of The Institute of British Geographers 36.3 (2011): 344–59.
28 Moses Chrispus Okello, “Elevating Transitional Local Justice or Crystallizing
Global Governance?” in Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After
Mass Violence, ed. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2010), 275.
29 Okello, “Elevating Transitional Local Justice,” 281.
30 Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf with Pierre Hazan, eds., Localizing Transitional
Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2010).
27
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jurisprudence with the occasional turn to political analysis of
its structures, the broader relations between tribunals, ‘ruleof-law’ and governance agendas, and the provision of security
to foster economic development is rarely considered. 31
Thus, she explores the relationship between normative notions of
justice and economic liberalism. While her findings stress the
emerging symbiosis between market-driven objectives and the
dissemination of international norms, this study scrutinizes the
imbalanced post-conflict justice support by Western donors who
favor retributive justice mechanism. It concentrates on Scandinavian
governments, in particular Sweden and Norway in BiH, with the goal
of discussing the reasons behind donor practices that rely
predominantly on war crimes trials and accountability strategies,
which hamper more comprehensive strategies within Bosnian society.
Research Design and Methodology
The selection of BiH as a case study is primarily based on its history
in global politics and international development assistance patterns.
BiH constitutes a post-conflict zone that has been on the agenda of
foreign aid donors for more than a decade. The country went
through multiple assistance phases each of them corresponding to
various stages of the Balkan conflict, including humanitarian aid,
post-conflict reconstruction, and, as of now, democratization
assistance. Therefore, the goal of studying BiH lies in generating new
insights on current Scandinavian aid strategies. The findings can then
serve as a catalyst that triggers a broader discussion on post-conflict
justice funding to implement more comprehensive practices on the
ground.
An important number of international development actors,
such as the European Union (EU), EU member states, the United
States, and the United Nations (UN), among other states and
international organizations, have supported and are currently assisting
BiH during its transition phase. This study, however, focuses on
Sara Kendall, “Donors’ Justice: Recasting International Criminal Accountability,”
Leiden Journal of International Law 24.03 (2011): 605.

31
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Scandinavian aid, notably on Norwegian and Swedish donor
assistance with regards to alternative transitional justice mechanisms.
This choice is based on two reasons. First, despite the important role
of EU assistance across the former Yugoslavia, Brussels’s
engagement in comprehensive transitional justice efforts that go
beyond retributive justice mechanisms remains limited. 32 Second,
Scandinavian states are often seen as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in world
politics, especially with regards to the provision of aid. 33 While their
unique position could be instrumental to strengthen bottom-up
initiatives in post-conflict justice, there has been little involvement in
either of the two cases. This selection therefore helps to shed light on
why these countries have not followed previous policy patterns,
which would consist of spearheading efforts to support new,
alternative transitional justice practices. 34
The study is based on extensive fieldwork in BiH between
2009 and 2011, including over three-dozen interviews with official
representatives of donor countries, activists and experts. Embassy
representatives from the Swedish and Norwegian Missions in
Sarajevo kindly responded to interview requests, providing valuable
reports and official documentation. Moreover, the research project
includes interviews with staff of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council (HJPC), 35 the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the EU Special Representative, and the OHR. Several
interviews and discussions with human rights activists including staff
from the Coalition for RECOM (a regional fact-finding initiative
Katy A. Crossley-Frolick, “The European Union and Transitional Justice:
Human Rights and Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Europe and Beyond,”
Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 3.1 (2011): 33–57.
33 Christine Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs Scandinavia’s Role in World
Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 37.1 (March 1, 2002): 11–23.
34 Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs.”
35 The HJPC is a national institution that serves as a watchdog within the judicial
system in BiH. The members of the Council appoint, train, and discipline judges.
The HJPC is also responsible for advising other government entities about judicial
budgets and administration. See also HJPC website at http://www.hjpc.ba/,
accessed January 15, 2013.
32
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created in 2008), the Research and Documentation Center, and the
Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Sarajevo are also a part of the
project data. The interviewees were chosen by their relevance to the
current transitional justice process and development aid strategies in
BiH and supplementary research subjects were added by using
snowball sampling. 36 Several participants agreed to be interviewed
only under the condition of anonymity. Their institutional affiliation
is nonetheless indicated.
In the following, this article provides an overview of Sweden
and Norway’s current aid for institutional reform and rule of law as
part of their transitional justice support in BiH. These state-centric
aid efforts are then contrasted with an analysis of new emerging
alternative post-conflict justice initiatives by local NGOs. Despite the
increasing role of civil society in restorative transitional justice efforts
in BiH, however, Swedish and Norwegian donor practices have not
adapted new broad strategies to shift larger parts of their aid to local
NGO actors. Drawing on these observations, the last part explains
why these changes in aid policies have failed to materialize.
Current Donor Practices and Challenges for Local NGOs
The primary internationally-sponsored post-conflict justice efforts in
BiH since the end of the conflict consisted of cooperating with the
ICTY and after 2005 holding domestic trials at the Court of BiH War
Crimes Chamber. 37 During the past decade, however, civil society

Chaim Noy, “Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in
Qualitative Research,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11.4 (2008):
327–44. Notwithstanding the openness of interviewees to participate in this study,
many of them refused to be referenced by their name due to potential political
consequences on the ground.
37 Jelena Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2009); James Gow, “The ICTY, War Crimes
Enforcement and Dayton: The Ghost in the Machine,” Ethnopolitics 5.1 (2006): 49–
65; Claire Garbett, “Localising Criminal Justice: An Overview of National
Prosecutions at the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,” Human Rights Law Review 10.3 (2010): 558–68.
36
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actors supporting transitional justice practices have grown. 38
Although Scandinavian donors have a reputation of engaging in
innovative development policies, post-conflict justice strategies
pursued in BiH follow more conventional goals—including
institutional reform and the rule of law, which are also part of the EU
integration strategy. 39 These observations are based on official reports
issued by the Bosnian government as well as donor reports. The first
set of data was extracted from a series of BiH aid reports published
by the BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, between 2006 and
2012. 40 Whereas the reports define ten different sectors that receive
aid—ranging from environmental protection to education—this
study focuses only on two sectors—‘Good Governance and
Institution Building’ henceforth governance and ‘Conflict Prevention
and Resolution, Peace and Security’ henceforth conflict prevention—
in order to analyze disbursements that are relevant for post-conflict
justice activities.
The second set of data was drawn from an analysis of both
the Norwegian and Swedish project grants since 2000. It exemplifies

Iavor Rangelov and Marika Theros, “Transitional Jsutice in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Coherence and Complementarity of EU Institutions and Civil
Society,” in Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Conflict
Resolution and Development: The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, eds. Kai
Ambos, Judith Large, and Marieke Wierda (London: Springer, 2009), 362.
39 Although Norway is not a member of the EU, officials at the Norwegian Mission
in Sarajevo emphasized that aid policies are increasingly implemented in
coordination with other bilateral EU member countries and EU staff in BiH.
Interview by author, 17 May 2011.
40 BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2006,” Donor
Coordination Forum, 2006; BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor
Mapping Report 2007,” Donor Coordination Forum, 2007; BiH Ministry of
Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2009-2008,” Donor Coordination
Forum, 2009; BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report
2011-2010,” Donor Coordination Forum, 2011; BiH Ministry of Finance and
Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2012-2011,” Donor Coordination Forum, 2012.
Although some report data for earlier periods are also available, most of the data
are missing or were only partially recorded and are therefore inapt for analytical
purposes.
38
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a state-centric disbursement strategy. 41 Norway, for example, has
directed a large part of its post-conflict justice assistance to the
HJPC. Although the autonomous institution was created in 2004 with
the goal of promoting general judicial reform in BiH, 42 Sven Marius
Urke, a seconded Norwegian civil servant who is an international
member of the HJPC, 43 believes the HJPC is crucial for promoting
war crimes prosecutions. To this end, the HJPC appoints judges to
the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the BiH Court, he explained.
Other members of international organizations share Mr Urke’s view
and stress the HJPC’s role for transitional justice processes not only
in BiH, but also across the region. 44 One of Norway’s principal aid
goals therefore consists of a so-called institutional knowledge transfer
model, in which best practices from the Norwegian judicial system
are applied to BiH’s judiciary, as some government representatives
put it. 45 Such a strategy remains nonetheless restricted to state
institutions and government elites rather than including grassroots
members of society.
In 2010, an internal evaluation report questions the
effectiveness of the established goals, stating that “Norway may have
exited too soon… or has not established operational clarity for

See the donor database website from the BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury
at http://db.donormapping.ba/, accessed February 3, 2013. The data used for the
analysis are post-2000, because in the years immediately after the end of the
conflict donor support consisted primarily of infrastructure-related aid to rebuild
physical damage within societies. This study, however, is specifically interested in
aid for post-conflict justice efforts.
42 Total judicial and legal sector reform funding for the period of 1996-2008 was
about 10 million Euro ($13.4 million USD), excluding secondment salaries to its
experts and civil servants working in BiH institutions.
43 Before becoming an international member of the HJPC, Mr. Urke was also part
of the international team working on the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) in
BiH.
44 Interviews by author with several members of international organizations,
including the OSCE, UNDP, and the EU, among others in May 2011.
45 Interview by author with several representatives of the Norwegian Embassy in
Sarajevo in May 2011.
41
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expected longer-term effects (reconciliation, democratisation).” 46 In
addition, attempts to successfully embrace a more NGO-focused
approach to implement alternative transitional justice efforts remain
limited. The report further criticized Norway’s development
performance in BiH, and since then the government has made an
effort to strengthen its ties with NGOs on the ground. 47 In addition
to existing smaller projects, the Norwegian government initiated
support to a handful of projects that include civil society
organizations, such as the Association of War Victims, 48 and Kuca
Povjerenja 49 and the Youth Initiative on Human Rights in BiH. 50 Yet,
these examples reflect neither common donor disbursement patterns,
nor established aid practices. 51 Furthermore, Norwegian post-conflict
justice projects that promote civil society show only limited signs of
direct collaboration with local non-profit organizations. This is the
case with the following two examples that receive Norwegian aid
support. The International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP),
an international non-profit organization established in 1996 to
monitor state cooperation in locating and identifying the disappeared
during the conflict, and other regional reconciliatory initiatives, such
as the Nansen Dialogue Network, 52 have had little effect in
empowering local grassroots actors. Instead of strengthening local
ownership from the bottom up, these organizations carry out topdown initiatives and develop sustainable government structures,

46 NORAD, “Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the
Western Balkans Volume I” (Oslo: Evaluation Department, Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation, 2010), 5.
47 NORAD, “Evaluation,” 8.
48 Support for the Women’s section in form of a knitting program to foster
inclusion and empowerment.
49 Support of theatre performance based on a century-old legend in Srebrenica.
50 Although some of YIHR’s activities are related to transitional justice, many of
the activities fall into the broader umbrella category of human rights.
51 For a full list see the Norwegian Embassy’s website at
http://www.norveska.ba/Embassy/Embassy_Fund/, accessed April 15, 2014.
52 See official website at http://www.nansen-dialogue.net/, accessed January 7,
2013.
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employing international NGOs to implement their work rather than
handing over responsibility to local actors.
Despite an NGO-friendly discourse, the Swedish case
resembles Norwegian practices. The Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency, (Sida), 53 for instance, summarizes
Sweden’s main development policy goals as follows: “[The
cooperation dialogue] with the country’s authorities will mainly be
focused on closer relations with the EU, but it will also cover… the
need to continually strengthen civil society and local ownership.” 54
Thus, Sweden’s main concern lies in supporting the EU integration
process, including coordinating and streamlining multilateral
development aid efforts. 55 Swedish assistance in the governance
sector concentrates on state prison reform and the support of the
HJPC. As for the latter, it is very technical and aims at institutional
reform:
We have been supporting the HJPC with a case management
system, an IT system, which… was a very technical project,
[creating] a link between those technical solutions and making
the system more effective but also more accountable. 56
Priority is thus given to projects that improve effectiveness and
accountability of post-conflict justice processes. Additionally, the
selection of cases illustrates that donors remain in control, managing
each project through an array of bureaucratic procedures. 57 While
some assistance to civil society initiatives in the conflict prevention
sector exists, these efforts are very elitist, with donors relying on their
own domestic civil society actors to implement the support. The
Swedish government, for instance, uses national non-profit
A government agency of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Sida, “Strategy for Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina:
January 2011 – December 2014” (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010), 2.
55 BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2012-2011,”
144, 146.
56 Interview by author with representative of the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo, 11
May 2011.
57 Interviews by author with several Scandinavian donor officials during fieldwork
in May 2011.
53
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organizations, including the Olof Palme International Center—a
Sweden-based NGO with ties to the national labour movement—and
the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, which is also headquartered in
Sweden. Such a trend, however, contributes to a local-international
disconnect, often ignoring local initiatives within society. This
disconnect is readily evident when looking at civil society transitional
justice efforts in BiH.
To illustrate this issue, the article turns its attention to postconflict justice NGO projects, describing their role in the process as
well as the problems they faced. Regardless of the limited support
Bosnian civil society actors receive from Scandinavian donors, the
number of local NGOs supporting alternative transitional justice
practices in BiH has grown in the past decade. These activities fall
into different categories, such as documentation, support for criminal
prosecutions, truth-seeking initiatives, reparations and advocacy of
victims’ groups, peace-building and reconciliation, memorials,
education, and public opinion. For this study, the author draws on a
selection of cases associated with documentation and truth-seeking. 58

58 For a discussion on education see Janine Natalya Clark, “Education in BosniaHercegovina: The Case for Root-and-Branch Reform,” New York Law School Journal
of Human Rights 9.3 (2010): 344–62; Briony Jones, “Exploring the Politics of
Reconciliation through Education Reform: The Case of Brčko District, Bosnia and
Herzegovina,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 6.1 (2012): 126–48; Clare
Magill, Alan Smith, and Brandon Hamber, The Role of Education in Reconciliation. The
Perspectives of Children and Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland,
Special EU Programmes Body (University of Ulster, 2009). For more details on
reparations see Quirine Eijkman, “Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional
Justice and Post-Conflict Reparations,” Global Jurist 10.3 (2010),
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gj.2010.10.3/gj.2010.10.3.1370/gj.2010.10.3.13
70.xml; Stephan Parmentier, Marta Valinas, and Elmar Weitekamp, “How to Repair
the Harm after Violent Conflict in Bosnia-Results of a Population-Based Survey,”
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 27 (2009): 27; Amnesty International, “Whose
Justice? The Women of Bosnia and Herzegovina Still Waiting” (Amnesty
International Publications, 2009). Alexander Jeffrey’s study examines the role of
civil society in war crimes prosecutions in BiH. Jeffrey, “The Political Geographies
of Transitional Justice.” For a study on the question of memorials in Omarska see
Manuela Brenner, “The Struggle of Memory. Practices of the (Non-) Construction
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They emphasize not only the importance of NGOs in transitional
justice contexts, but also reveal the difficulties activists are
confronted with.
As early as the beginning of the BiH conflict, different
organizations started documenting war crimes and missing persons.
The Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo, for
instance, created a comprehensive database on human rights
violations, publishing a book with the findings in 2007 as well as a
website that uses Google Maps in order to provide information on
the crime type, the number of victims and their gender, the location
of the crime, and details about the perpetrator. 59 This documentation
initiative, the ‘Human Losses Project,’ aimed at creating a collective
memory of the victims in BiH and helped promote a human rights
dialogue in the country. Yet, RDC’s efforts to quantify the victims of
the war in the hope of demystifying the number of deaths, fell short
of reshaping Bosnian public opinion at large. On the contrary, the
publication of a report that lowered the number of Bosnian
victims—around 100,000 instead of the 250,000 generally referred to
in Bosnian society—fueled uproar in Bosniak elite circles and
triggered threats against the RDC and Mirsad Tokača, its director. 60
In the end, Mr. Tokača’s choice to solely focus on a bottom-up
perspective without including local elites backfired and ultimately

of a Memorial at Omarska,” Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift Für Politik Und Gesellschaft.03
(2011): 349.
59 Lara Nettlefield, “Research and Repercussions of Death Tolls : The Case of the
Bosnian Book of the Dead,” in Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in
Global Crime and Conflict, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2010).
60 Nettlefield, 186. While this documentation project includes war crimes and
human rights violations committed across the entire Bosnian territory, more
locally-oriented initiatives were also launched, such as an archive on the Mostar
region by the Center for Peace and Interethnic Relationships; see also Olga MartinOrtega, “Transitional Justice in the Quest for Just and Durable Peace in BosniaHerzegovina,” in Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and
the Western Balkans, ed. Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl (London: Routledge,
2012).
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sealed the fate of his initiative. 61 Even though the project struggled to
shape a collective memory process in BiH by setting the record of
war crimes victims straight, it created a number of new
opportunities. 62 Inspired by this impressive project, the OSCE
launched a website with a BiH war crimes case map in February
2014, which provides information on all the war crimes cases
adjudicated in BiH. 63 While the OSCE project is less ambitious, it
nevertheless uses the ideas and technology created at the grassroots
level, proving the innovative catalyst function of NGOs for
transitional justice processes in BiH.
Civil society attempts with the goal of implementing
restorative justice initiatives, including truth and reconciliation
commissions, are another fundamental part of post-conflict justice
processes in BiH. 64 Yet, these efforts have also struggled to gain
international support, such as a regional bottom-up truth and
reconciliation commission (TRC) attempt. It is called the Regional
Commission to determine and disclose the facts about war crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia, in short: The Coalition for
RECOM. It was launched in 2008 by a group of NGOs across the
former Yugoslavia and focused on war crimes in BiH, among other
issues, and is an excellent showcase of the reluctance expressed by
public authorities and international donors to support alternative
post-conflict justice mechanisms. 65 While both external and internal
Nettlefield, “Research and Repercussions of Death Tolls: The Case of the
Bosnian Book of the Dead.”, 186-187.
62 Reminiscent of the RDC’s initiative, the Serbian NGO, Humanitarian Law
Center, launched its first volume of a book, The Kosovo Memory Book 1998-2000, on 7
September 2011.
63 See for instance the website of the OSCE Mission for BiH at
http://www.warcrimesmap.oscebih.org/, accessed April 17, 2014.
64 See, for instance, a UN report on various transitional justice mechanisms in postconflict contexts. Kofi Annan, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General” (United
Nations, 2004).
65 Arnaud Kurze, “Democratizing Justice in the Post-Conflict Balkans: The
Dilemma of Domestic Human Rights Activists,” CEU Political Science Journal 7.3
(2012): 254.
61
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problems contributed to the fate of RECOM, its innovative regional
approach created a new space for stalled post-conflict justice
processes. 66 Creating a dialogue with different actors at the local,
national and international level differs from the war crimes trials
strategies used until now. Yet, earlier TRC attempts in BiH faced
similar challenges. Iavor Rangelov and Marika Theros describe the
difficulties of local NGOs in overcoming institutional obstacles and
creating sufficient political momentum to implement Bosnian truth
and reconciliation commissions. They note that:
Civil society has been both active and largely ignored in the
process of establishing a [TRC] for BiH. The Citizens
Association for Truth and Reconciliation was established by
Jakob Finci in order to lobby for the creation of a TRC. It
successfully liaised with the [ICTY] and secured their support
for a truth-telling body. But the draft law that resulted from
this effort failed to attract political backing. The second TRC
initiative involved the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
taking the lead in partnership with the local NGO Dayton
Project, created to facilitate the process. This initiative
coordinated a working group composed of the eight leading
political parties to draft legislation. It provoked an outcry
among civil society and the public since both were excluded
from the process of consultation and negotiation. 67
The above examples highlight the obstacles activists had to overcome
to implement alternative post-conflict justice mechanisms in BiH,
while also pointing to the valuable contributions of NGOs to
improve larger transitional justice processes in this fragile
environment. More importantly, however, these cases also
demonstrate that the reasons for the lack of international support are
complex and often hidden behind multiple layers of problems. The
intricacies of the RDC and RECOM cases therefore serve as
Kurze, 252-253 and Jelena Subotić, “The RECOM Initiative: The Promise and
Peril of Regional Truth Seeking in the Balkans,” Puls Demokratije, February 10,
2010.
67 Rangelov and Theros, “Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Coherence and Complementarity of EU Institutions and Civil Society,” 364.
66
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excellent examples to illustrate that donors are not the only ones to
blame for the lack of support.
Reasons for Scandinavian Reluctance to Support Transitional
Justice NGOs
Notwithstanding the promising potential of NGOs for transitional
justice in BiH, progressive and innovative development actors, such
as Norway and Sweden, have been hesitant to systematically and
substantially increase their support for post-conflict justice advocacy
on the ground. Why did Norwegian and Swedish donors give priority
to government-run projects, instead of supporting local civil society
initiatives? Analyzing the rationale behind retributive justice
mechanisms at the ICTY and at the WCC at the BiH Court, this
section offers an ideological explanation for the poor Scandinavian
support for restorative transitional justice activism in BiH. This
explanation is complemented with empirical evidence on current
institutional conditions, which further fuels this phenomenon. Last,
the section critically discusses the role of NGO agency in postconflict justice efforts.
Sweden and Norway’s strong adherence to international
humanitarian law explains their preference to support domestic war
crimes trials and retributive justice related projects instead of
alternative transitional justice initiatives by civil society. These
normative beliefs were predominantly shaped by international war
crimes trials for the former Yugoslavia put in place by the ICTY. In
fact, the creation of the UN ad hoc Tribunal constituted a watershed
moment leading to a spill-over effect of international humanitarian
law across the region and worldwide. 68 Due to the difficulties faced
by the Tribunal in The Hague, ICTY advocates—such as its first
Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone—were initially against any truth
Robert Cryer and Paul Mora, “I. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
International Criminal Law: Backing the Future?” The International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 59.03 (2010): 805; Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 46; Ruti G. Teitel, “Global Transitional
Justice,” Center for Global Studies Working Paper Series on Human Rights, Global Justice &
Democracy.8 (Spring 2010).
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commission attempts. They believed this would undermine the
initially fragile work of the Tribunal. 69 While this discourse changed
over time to include more comprehensive practices, 70 accountability
efforts in The Hague and across many Balkan states continued to
follow a results-driven dogma to equate a successful transition model
with the number of processed war crimes cases. 71 Indeed,
Scandinavian donors are among the supporters who prioritize
bilateral aid for war crimes trials to systematically measure the
outcome of their aid allocations. 72 A Norwegian official even stressed
the importance of ‘streamlining’ these funding processes to improve
efficiency and transparency. 73
Moreover, adequate evaluation processes and assessment
practices, including streamlining, are important cornerstones in
Scandinavian donor strategies. Years of prosecutions in The Hague
and at domestic courts in BiH produced a large archive of detailed
court records, triggering a culture of assessment at the ICTY and in
the Balkans. By increasing the number of war crimes sentences,
retributive justice advocates sought to optimize international criminal
law. Donors, such as Norway and Sweden, willingly funded judiciary
and prosecutorial activities as aid effectiveness could be easily
assessed. 74 These assessments were for the most part based on widely
disseminated ICTY accountability guidelines. 75 As a case in point, the
findings and recommendations of an international evaluation report
on the BiH State Court – which also included a Norwegian donor

Viktor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the
Struggle for State Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 41–43.
70 Annan, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies: Report of the Secretary-General.”
71 OSCE, “Delivering Justice in BiH: An Overview of War Crimes Processing from
2005 to 2010” (Sarajevo: OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010).
72 Interviews by author with Scandinavian donor officials and EU representatives in
May 2011.
73 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy on May 17,
2011.
74 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy.
75 See ICTY website at http://www.icty.org, accessed February 17, 2013.
69
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report –used statistical data confirming these ICTY objectives. 76
Many of the studies documented the exact number of completed
cases by the court and employ quantitative analysis, such as bar
graphs, pie charts, and statistical forecasts. In addition, an OSCE
report, which compared the outcomes and the work performance of
the judiciary’s war crimes section, observed that the prosecution of
war criminals in BiH progressively improved since 2005. One of the
figures at the end of the report, for instance, indicated that the
number of accused brought to trial annually from January 2005 until
September 2010 rose from 16 in 2005 to 28 in 2010. 77 As a result,
collecting and evaluating statistical trial data became an integral part
of a performance monitoring policy by Norway and Sweden. Their
transitional justice aid strategies were thus conditioned by prevailing
war crimes trials and accountability efforts.
The impact assessment of alternative transitional justice
efforts, however, represents an intricate task as quantifying and
measuring restorative, reconciliatory, and memory-centered projects
in post-conflict societies poses many difficulties. Not surprisingly,
local NGOs are less inclined to employ assessment and streamlining
processes in their work on restorative post-conflict justice efforts. As
a consequence, Scandinavian donors were skeptical and expressed
concerns as to how some of the local alternative transitional justice
practices could be properly measured and their outcomes evaluated. 78
These obstacles persist and pose a real conundrum with some
scholars and practitioners arguing that only long-term assessments
can provide answers to questions on reconciliation and how to deal
with the past within traumatized societies. 79 While others also
NORAD, “Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the
Western Balkans Volume I.”
77 OSCE, “Delivering Justice in BiH: An Overview of War Crimes Processing from
2005 to 2010,” 98.
78 Interviews by author with several Scandinavian donor officials during fieldwork
in May 2011.
79 Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and
Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
76

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 35-62

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2017

23

Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 2

Arnaud Kurze 58

questioned the performance-driven evaluation trend, 80 it nevertheless
incited positive change. On the one hand, regardless of the challenges
of generating statistically meaningful data, some NGOs developed
quantitative evaluation tools to measure reconciliatory post-conflict
activities. The creation of databases with archives of missing persons
and documentation of war crimes and other human rights violations
serve as excellent examples. 81 On the other hand, human rights
activists felt the pressure and adapted to this environment. For
instance, several organizations expanded their institutional knowledge
and initiated processes to reform their organizational structures; both
reforms are important steps in the eyes of Scandinavian donors to
build aid recipients’ capacity and legitimacy. 82
The question of local NGO capacity, however, is a doubleedged sword, further exacerbating the range of Norwegian and
Swedish grassroots support. In fact, Scandinavian aid agencies do not
necessarily recognize the potential and power of civil society for
transitional justice due to the institutional gap that runs between
donors and recipients on the ground, as a Swedish representative
described:
Our support is very much focused on our partners and the
governments in the countries themselves. This is a very
significant aspect of how we work, which comes from topdown. It comes from above; it comes from these global
processes; it comes from Stockholm headquarters; rather than
specific experiences in the field… Administratively, we can’t
work with smaller NGOs. When we get requests from local
NGOs, we say no straight away, because our aid agenda
Hugo Van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds., Assessing
the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009); Geoff Dancy, “Impact Assessment,
Not Evaluation: Defining a Limited Role for Positivism in the Study of
Transitional Justice,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 355.
81 Interviews by author with representatives of the Research and Documentation
Center on May 17, 2011.
82 Interviews by author with representatives of the Norwegian Embassy and the
EU Delegation in Sarajevo in May 2011.
80
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stipulates that we should work on fewer but larger projects.
There is a whole bunch of steps that we have to go through
in our own internal procedures—both in terms of making the
assessment and in terms of carrying out the administrative
tasks—that take a lot of time. We wouldn’t be able to manage
if we had lots of projects. 83
Defending the institutional top-down structures and processes in
place, a Norwegian representative argued that “We are trying to
balance this as well as we can and we could have been much more
into smaller, local organizations, if we were better staffed.” 84
According to her, it is the responsibility of local advocacy leaders to
seek funding support by initiating a dialogue with the Norwegian
Embassy in Sarajevo. On the topic of the NGO, RECOM, for
instance, she explained:
Since I’ve been here, we haven’t been working with
[RECOM]. I don’t know very much about them and they
haven’t been here to present their work. But [introducing
your work to donors] is how we get aware of you. If there is a
project that would like to receive Norwegian funding… then
[the NGO leaders] should come here and tell us what they
would like to do. 85
With regards to other required steps in the funding process, she
continued that a project proposal is based on the art of grant writing,
requiring specific resources and skills:
A good proposal is indicative about a stringent way of
thinking. It helps [the applicant] to ask basic questions, such
as: what aspects are the most important? What would they
exactly like to do? It also helps them to prioritize the issues,
because they have to fill in a form describing the entire

Interview by author with representative of the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo on
May 11, 2011.
84 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy in Sarajevo
on May 17, 2011.
85 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy.
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process. And in the end they have to show that they deliver,
so that they can ask for more funding the next year. 86
Oftentimes, however, applying for funds requires filling in very
lengthy and technical application forms. Activists working for smaller
local organizations do not have the means to cope with these
challenges. On the contrary, several local NGO representatives
complained that they often lack the staff and expertise in grant
writing to apply for available funds. 87 As a result, the absence of these
essential skills frequently impedes many local organizations from
establishing sustainable professional relations with Scandinavian
donors. The above elaboration of the varied issues demonstrates that
determining a scapegoat for the absence of grassroots funding for
restorative justice mechanisms is difficult. 88 While ideologically driven
Norwegian and Swedish development strategies are partly to blame
for this controversial trend, civil society organizations carry
nonetheless a degree of responsibility to improve their relationship
with Scandinavian donors.
Conclusion
This article discussed the role of two international donors, Sweden
and Norway, and their aid engagement with local NGOs carrying out
restorative justice projects, such as fact-finding initiatives and
memory-related projects. The author argued that despite a growing
number of restorative justice projects by civil society organizations in
BiH, post-conflict justice aid from Scandinavian donors to Bosnian
NGOs working in the field remain very limited. Drawing on
extensive fieldwork data, he illustrated that different factors,
including institutional and ideological obstacles, were at the heart of
Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy.
Interviews by author with representatives of the Coalition for RECOM, Youth
Initiative for Human Rights BiH and Research and Documentation Center in May
2011.
88 A related issue in this context is the politicization of aid. United States foreign aid
policies are an excellent example of this problem. For an in-depth discussion of this
issue see Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
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this problem. In the first part, he reviewed a selection of postconflict, development and transitional justice literature, highlighting
the importance of interdisciplinary analysis and the role of NGOs in
transitional justice processes. Furthermore, he pointed to the need of
further scholarship on international donor practices in transitional
justice contexts to better understand persisting state-centric aid
policies. In the second part, he outlined the research design and
methodology. The third part focused on the growing but difficult role
of NGOs in post-conflict contexts. Finally, the article scrutinized the
reasons as to why donors remain reluctant to support alternative
transitional justice initiatives led by Bosnian NGOs.
These findings have important implications for policy
strategies not only in the region, but also for transitional justice donor
practices in other post-conflict contexts. First, the study stresses the
difficulties with regards to policy coordination. Despite collaborative
efforts of different agencies and various donor countries on large
transitional justice projects, the relationship between actors on the
ground and their international counterparts who support local efforts
is weak. While the above case study illustrates the obstacles in view of
a holistic post-conflict justice strategy largely due to the persisting
political challenges, these conditions are not unique to the former
Yugoslavia. In fact, Tunisia’s transition process faces similar issues.
The Tunisian political elite that still consists in large part of members
of the old regime is grappling with a political force that for decades
was constrained to operate in the opposition, made up mainly of
Ennahda’s Islamists. Second, establishing a sustainable working
relationship between donors and local actors requires trust and
availability. Often, however, donors are not aware of local projects
and initiatives that need funding due to a limited network of partners
and resources. Consequently, it is not only the responsibility of
international donors to reach out to local actors. Instead, grassroots
activists and smaller civil society organizations are also responsible
for mobilizing their local resources to receive funding for their ideas
and initiatives. It is time for both sides—civil society actors engaged
in restorative justice activities and Scandinavian donors—to enhance
collaborative efforts by mapping common guidelines to ensure access
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to smaller funding for local organizations, streamlined outcome
assessments, and the creation of stronger relations between state
institutions and society in BiH. The potential for such a dialogue
exists, and the moment for encouraging the necessary steps to bridge
this gap is now.
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